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Disappearing Sheep: The Unexpected
Consequences of the Emergence of the
Caterpillar Fungus Economy in Golok,
Qinghai, China
for Nick Park
This paper analyzes the “disappearing sheep” phenomenon that has occurred due to the selling off of entire
flocks of sheep by nomadic households, as observed in Domkhok Township in Golok Tibetan Autonomous
Prefecture of Qinghai Province, and relates it to the rise of the caterpillar fungus economy. Gathering and
sale of the fungus, as well as leasing the land use rights to gatherers, bring for local pastoralists an income
unmatched in size by anything else available to the rural population of Golok. The paper shows how the
availability of this new source of income changes the local nomadic pastoralists’ ways of managing livestock
production which, prior to the boom, was the basis of their households’ budgets. The paper contextualizes
different decisions made regarding yak and sheep production in terms of the pastoralists’ own cultural and
economic rationales. Although in the last decade state investments have changed the economy of the area,
the changes discussed in this paper have been possible due to the emergence of the new caterpillar fungusrelated economy rather than because of this state investment. This paper furnishes comparative data for
studying economic performance and social change throughout rural Tibet in the first decade of the Open
Up the West campaign.

INTRODUCTION
The Domkhok (sDom khog)1 Township is
remembered by its senior generation residents as
a place teeming with wildlife, and literally covered
with deer antlers and wild yak bones. The migration
stories of the Metsang (dMe tshang) people say that
before they finally settled in Domkhok, they used
the land in the Dom (sDom) river valley as seasonal
hunting grounds. The tribe’s ancestors are praised
in the elderly people’s stories for their courage in
meeting the real owners of the land: the wild yaks or
drong (’brong). Some of the huge yak skulls exposed
on the house roofs are said to date back to that time.
The name Dom too, is said to bear witness to those
days when the dom or Tibetan bear walked freely
through these empty lands undisturbed by its human
neighbors.
The hunting paradise the Metsang people found
belongs to the memories of how it was when the
first Metsang hunters set foot on this land. Hunting
1. Tibetan words are transcribed according to their local
pronunciation. The Wylie transliteration in brackets indicates the
Tibetan spelling.

and weapons are no longer discussed today, but
today Domkhok’s fame stems from something utterly
different. When Deng Xiaoping’s 1980s reforms
opened the door to private trade and allowed a
rise in the market price of the caterpillar fungus or
Ophiocordyceps sinensis2, Domkhok turned out to
be a valuable source of this sought-after medicinal
product. The local nomadic pastoralists were given
a chance to earn other than livestock-related income
and build their prosperity under the new Household
Responsibility system. Domkhok Township started
attracting scores of people from outside Golok, who,
under changing policy regimes, paid high digging
2. Ophiocordyceps sinensis is a fungus endemic to the
Tibetan plateau, and noted from the Tibetan areas of China and
from along-the-Himalaya-belt in Nepal, Bhutan and India. It is an
entomophagous fungus feeding on larvae of certain populations
or species of moths of Thitarodes. Infecting the larvae the fungus
“consumes” the tissues of the host organism and completes its
living cycle by producing spores which will infect new hosts. The
Ophiocordyceps’ hybrid look gave it its Tibetan (yartsa gunbu;
dbyar rtsa dgun ’bu) and Chinese name (dong chong xia cao) or
“summer grass winter worm”, as well as its English appellation:
caterpillar fungus. It is used in medicine production, as a diet
supplement and in a rich “gift” culture; cf. Winkler 2008a, b and
more; Devkota 2008 and 2006, and Sharma 2004.
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fees and searched the grassland for caterpillar fungus, thus
directly and indirectly contributing to the improvement in the
township’s economic position.
Two decades later Domkhok continues to be seen as a
paradise for private diggers, who risk hardships and lawbreaking to enter it in the caterpillar fungus gathering season.
At the same time the township has undergone visible changes,
and the income from the fungus gathering has been one of
the engines of many developments in the area. Whether done
with public or private money, the results made Domkhok an
example of how development in pastoral regions in Qinghai
should look: the prefecture’s official guests are given tours
through the township and shown the level of progress and
improved life conditions of the pastoralists. More and more
houses are being built, the roads get better and better, and
the mobile phone coverage reaches deeper into the highlands.
Meanwhile, from Domkhok’s natural landscape other animals
are disappearing. After the wild yaks, alive in the stories about
the past, the time has come for sheep.
THE AIM AND THE DATA
This paper focuses on the decline in the number of sheep
owned by nomadic Tibetan pastoralists in China: decline not
in the sense of increased sales but sales-off, when nomadic
households sell off entire flocks of sheep at one time. This
phenomenon was casually reported on earlier, but no study
up to this date attempted at a systematic explanation of the
motives that bring the pastoralists to this sheep selling off
decision. This paper analyzes the dynamics and scale of the
“disappearing sheep” phenomenon as observed in Domkhok
Township, and reveals the rationale for the local actors’
decisions. It analyzes the pastoralist households’ budgets and
shows what contribution sheep production can have for their
economy.
I argue that declining sheep numbers should be analyzed
together with the emergence of the new, non-pastoral sources
of income. In the case of Domkhok Township, this is cash
income from gathering Ophiocordyceps sinensis, as well as the
sale and leasing of land to others for that purpose. Among
the reasons contributing to the decrease are changes in
demographics in the area (smaller households do not have
enough of a work force for sheep breeding), insufficient
grass resources and state policies aimed at reducing livestock
numbers to improve the quality of the grassland environment.
The focus however is on the economic factor. Without it,
I argue, the decision to sell off the sheep would be more
difficult to make.
Domkhok Township is a good case for studying the
consequences of the growth of the trade in non-pastoral
products for the nomads’ other basic economic occupations.
Decreased dependence on pastoral income and growing
reliance on other sources is not unique to the studied
area. This paper contributes to our understanding of
transformations which pastoral economies in Tibetan areas of
China or elsewhere undergo–either due to their exposure to
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the caterpillar fungus market or due to emergence of other
income opportunities coming from outside the pastoral
economy. This study also adds to knowledge of what happens
to pastoral economies in situations of rapid modernization
and increased marketization.
This article is based on long-term anthropological research
conducted in Machen County of Golok (mGo log) Tibetan
Autonomous Prefecture (TAP) of Qinghai Province, China,
between 2007 and 2010. It uses officially published numbers
on the economic status of Domkhok, from both the widelyavailable online and more “confidential” local government
circulated sources, and compares them with the findings of
the author’s own survey.3 The quantitative data from these
sources is supplemented by information from interviews
and informal conversations with a wide group of informants
ranging from pastoralists to officials of various levels of
state administration. Information from the interviews helps
evaluate the data from the other two sources (quantitative
from official records and from my survey) and sets them in
the frame of human reasoning and choices made.
STUDIED AREA
What is today Domkhok Township has been under the
jurisdiction of Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of
Qinghai Province since 1955.4 It is part of Machen (rMa chen)
County, and enjoys a favorable location 33 kilometers distant
from the town of Tawu (rTa wo) or Golok’s administration
centre. The prefecture lies at the average altitude of 4,100m
(Domkhok’s average altitude is 3,800m) above sea level and is
characterized by a high plateau climate with an average yearly
temperature of 0.4˚C (0.6˚C in Domkhok). This makes mobile
animal husbandry the most suitable economy, and yak and
sheep breeding has for many centuries been the main source
of subsistence income for Golok’s population. In Domkhok
(where 99 percent of the population is Tibetan), out of 1,812
residents 1,752 persons (or 397 households) are rural-based
and engage in the livestock economy.
The township is inhabited by a community identifying
itself as Wranakh (sBra nag).5 The township has been created
from territories which, in a traditional sense, belonged to
the Metsang tribe or dewa (lde ba).6 In the “old society” (as
3. I am far from both taking the official statistics at face value as well
as discrediting them as useless for academic purposes, for reasons similar to
those discussed by Fischer (2005: 6ff). The statistics used in this study emerge
from the “cooperation” between the data collectors and the pastoralists:
supplying inaccurate data is also in their interest. Such is the case when the
informants “surmise that their behaviors can be taken into consideration in
the (re)distribution of goods which are important for them or can serve as
the basis for the institution to evaluate them” and are driven by “the desire
to obtain certain goods or the desire to show themselves from a good side,
and as a consequence—by social values to which the informants relate their
position and behavior” (Sułek 1988: 17).
4. Golok TAP was founded as an Autonomous Region in 1954. In 1955
the name was changed to “Prefecture”.
5. For more on the Wranakh tribes cf. Sułek 2010.
6. Metsang is customarily referred to as dewa. Tsowa (tsho ba), a similar
term also in use in Golok, is usually associated with bigger divisions, such as

the time prior to the effective incorporation of the discussed
territories into the People’s Republic of China is called), all the
lands whose waters end in the Dom and Chieb (Khyeb) rivers
(both belong to the Ma/rMa or Yellow River basin) constitute
the Metsangs’ property. The Metsangs split into three subbranches, of which two are to be found in Domkhok. The
first richen (ri chen)7, with Tanchen (Tang chen/Dwangs
chen) as its main part, is mostly inhabited by Metsang Jarkor
(rGya skor), and the second, in the proper Dom river valley, is
where Metsang Sangrkor (Sangs skor) dominate. This article
is based on material gathered in the latter.
DOMKHOK AND HER NEIGHBORS
Domkhok Township is often said to be the most
prosperous township in Golok – so the local state officials
and other informants say. In the common thinking, reflected
at the level of stereotypes and gossiping, this economic
success of Domkhok is generalized over other non-Golok
Tibetan natives of Machen, who are believed by their
neighbors to be more affluent and better connected than
the rest of the “average” Goloks. This view, leveling all those
Tibetan nomadic pastoralists who are not Goloks in this part
of the prefecture, can be partly justified when one looks at
the whole of Machen County with its peculiarities. With
Chongmar (Tib. Khrong dmar alias Chamahe)8 and the other
three townships, Yigzhung (dByug gzhung), Tanzhung (Tang
gzhung/Dwangs gzhung) and Tanlag (Tang legs/Dwangs
legs), whose land is of low productivity and population (all
of Golok stock) covered by the resettlement project at the
one end, and Gangri (Gangs ri, Chin. Xueshan) or Domkhok
(inhabited by the Wranakhs) with their fertile pasturelands
at the other, the county illustrates the different scenarios the
pastoral communities can face. Table 1 provides background
information about all the eight townships (xiang) and two
towns (zhen) of Machen.9
Domkhok’s production base can be looked at from two
angles: of grassland resources and of livestock ownership and
income. Of Domkhok’s total area of 11,695 qi10 (circa 780 km²)
91.59 percent is classified as grassland, leaving 8.41 percent
for mountain ranges and areas out of human use. Of the
grassland, about 674 km² or 86.39 percent of the township’s
total land area is or can be in actual use. This is a high rate,
although not dissimilar to other parts of Machen11, where this
Wranakh of which Metsang is a part.
7. Richen (Chin. dadui) and richung (ri chung, Chin. xiaodui) are
names used for administration units under the township.
8. Similar to Gangri, Chongmar functions in Golok under its Chinese
name Chamahe.
9. The data come from Machen County’s statistical yearbook (MSY
2009; 11ff, 44ff, 60) and the County’s official website: www.maqin.gov.cn/
html/143/5688/html, www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5684.html, www.maqin.
gov.cn/html/143/5691/html, www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5690/html, www.
maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5686/html,
www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/2046/
html, www.maqin.gov.cn/html/143/5687/html.
10. A Chinese area unit, equals 100 mu or 6.67 hectares.
11. Rarja (Ra rgya), since it is not of purely pastoral, but mixed pastoralagricultural character, is not listed here.

usable grassland ratio is, for example, 79.13 percent in Tawu
xiang, 90.36 percent in Yigzhung, 81 percent in Tanzhung,
87.16 percent in Tanlag, 80.42 percent in Chongmar, a very
high 94.01 percent in Tawu zhen and, visibly less, in Tawu
Zhuma (rTa wo zhol ma) – 68.58 percent and Gangri – 68.93
percent. Calculating stocking rates in the total area of usable
grassland is problematic, since the grassland contracted and
used does not have to be identical with the grassland deemed
usable. If the land contracted to the pastoralists was similar to
the area of usable grassland the stocking rates for Domkhok
would be: four animals (one yak, three sheep) per qi of land
or 60 animals per square kilometer (14 yaks, 46 sheep).12
As regards people’s livelihood and livestock ownership, an
average Domkhok household (taking the data from Table 1
as reliable) would own 110 animals, including 26 yaks and
84 sheep. This is not the highest rate of livestock ownership,
and in Gangri the numbers are higher: 138 animals in total,
including 42 yaks and 95 sheep. For Tawu xiang, the numbers
are: 107 animals per household (22 yaks and 84 sheep) and
for Tawu Zhuma 93 animals per household (29 yaks and 63
sheep). For the rest of Machen the numbers are: Yigzhung
37 animals (11 yaks, 26 sheep), Tanlag 49 animals (32 yaks,
16 sheep) and Tawu zhen 85 animals (61 yaks, 23 sheep).
Annual income statistics are not an adequate representation
of the pastoralists’ incomes, but show disparities between
different parts of Machen. Here the leading position goes
to Gangri with 5,319 yuan per person – this township was
made known as having one of the highest per capita incomes
in Golok by Goldstein (1996: 18). The second place goes
to Tawu xiang (5,305 yuan), and the third to Domkhok
(5,091 yuan). Other townships have average rural incomes
significantly lower: 3,277 yuan for Tawu Zhuma, 3,341 yuan
for Rarja, 2,937 yuan for Tanlag, 2,189 yuan for Yigzhung
and 1,290 yuan for Tawu zhen. The relative affluence of the
Gangri-Domkhok-Tawu trio relates to the medicinal fungus
Ophiocordyceps sinensis.
OPHIOCORDYCEPS IN DOMKHOK
Based on estimated numbers Domkhok is one of the
leading producers of Ophiocordyceps in Machen, if not in
the whole of Golok. No information about the amount of
Ophiocordyceps gathered is included in the official statistics,13
but Domkhok officials, interviewed in the course of this study,
estimate that each year the Township sells between 1,000
to 2,000 jin14 (half to one ton) of the fungus. The average
quality, measured by the larger size and heavier weight of the
12. Numbers of horses in Domkhok are insignificant compared to yaks
or sheep. Yet, one can read them from the difference between yak and sheep
numbers and the total livestock population in Table 1.
13. According to Li et al. Machen produces 6.4 tons of the fungus per
year, but only 20 percent of that is gathered (2010: 32). This number seems
too low, given the size of the seasonal influx of gatherers into the county.
Since the number of gatherers does not decrease there must be resources
which can support such a mass of diggers. For more on measuring how much
yartsa Tibet produces, cf. Winkler 2010.
14. Chinese weight unit which equals 500g.
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1
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Township
(xiang)/
town
(zhen)

Permanent
Residents
(Pastoralists)

Households

Land Area
(in qi/km²)

Grassland
(in qi/km²)

Usable
Grassland
(in qi/km²)

Domkhok
xiang

1,723

369

11,695/
779.67

10,712/
714.13

10,104/
673.60

1,804

458

3,989

956

1,536

378

10,197

2,235

-

-

3,691

791

-

-

15,292/
1019.47
22,578/
1505.20
18,260/
1217.33
38,464/
2564.27
14,497/
966.47
23,791/
1586.07
8,385/
559

2,493

600

915

301

20,264/
1350
27,206/
1813.73
24,615/
1641
39,393/
2626
17,289/
1152
26,023/
1734.87
9,885/
659
22,137/
1475.80
12,047/
803.13

15,292/
942.67
22,578/
1,438.33
16,882/
1,125.47
32,251/
2,150.07
13,897/
926.47
22,682/
1,512.13
8,007/
533.80
20,004/
1,333.60
11,326/
755.07

Gangri
xiang
Tawu
xiang
Shar Tawu
xiang
Rarja
zhen
Chongmar1
xiang
Tanlag
xiang
Tanzhung
xiang
Yigzhung
xiang
Tawu
Zhen

1,399.27
11,779/
785.27

Annual Income
per Person
(in yuan)

Livestock

Yaks

Sheep

40,958

9,441

31,012

5,091

63,246

19,315

43,300

5,319

102,729

21,320

80,054

5,305

35,120

10,959

23,700

3,277

168,705

85,283

81,388

3,341

-

-

-

-

38,867

25,611

12,599

2,937

-

-

-

-

22,455

6,889

15,270

2,189

25,727

18,508

6,972

1,290

Table 1: Ground data for eight townships and two towns of Machen County, Golok TAP, 2008.
1. The latest data for Chongmar and Tanzhung come from 2005 and 2007, and due to time difference have not been included (apart from values for the land and
grassland area).

fungus (which determine how many specimens one jin or
half a kilogram contains) is 1,500 to 2,000 pieces per jin or
3,000 to 4,000 per kg. High quality fungus from the valleys
of Drilung (’Bri lung), Wirkung (Bas sgong) and Churu (Chu
ros/Chu rul) reaches 1,000 or fewer pieces per jin (2,000 or
less per kg).15 This quality fungus gets the highest prices and
in April-May 2010 in Tawu was paid even 70,000 yuan and
more per jin or 140,000 yuan per kilogram. In summer 2010,
it equaled circa 7000 and 14,000 euro.
The amounts of the fungus gathered by individual
households are not easy to study. The pastoralists widely
underreport the size of their “harvests,” trying to show their
land as of not good value, their income insignificant, and their
intervention into the grassland environment smaller. It is not
uncommon to hear declarations that a household gathered
“one thousand pieces” only. Observation conducted in the
field shows the opposite: a skilful gatherer can find a hundred
or so pieces in one day.16 According to the township leaders’
estimations a single household should be able to gather two
and a half or even three kilograms of the fungus in a season.
This would mean approximately 200,000 yuan income per
household as a whole.
The above numbers give only a partial picture of the
economic importance of Ophiocordyceps for Domkhok
inhabitants. Another, more substantial income is from leasing
15. The lower the number of single fungi in one jin the better the
quality. The fungus from Yushu (Yul shul) TAP can give even 700 pieces per
half a kilogram. But in Nepal, for example, even the biggest yartsa is so small
that one never gets less than 2,000 fungi per half a kilogram (Shiva Devkota,
pers. comm., November 11, 2010).
16. Winkler recorded 120 fungi gathered by a seventeen year old
nomad (personal communication, December 17, 2010).
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the land use rights to persons from outside of Domkhok,
who pay high fees to get into the township for gathering.
The legal aspects of leasing the land are complicated. As
long as the tenants are from within the prefecture and have
a rural registered hukou (household registration book), their
situation is safe. Legal regulations passed in Golok in 20072010 forbid, however, leasing the land to gatherers from
beyond Golok (EXP 2010: 4, and Winkler 2008c: 1). Control
points at the prefecture’s roads are supposed to “sieve” the
illegal diggers off the Golok residents. In spite of a variety
of measures the administration takes, the local population
continues leasing their land for caterpillar fungus digging.
According to the official estimates, each year Domkhok is
visited by around 10,000 diggers, among whom persons from
other parts of Qinghai, Gansu and Sichuan dominate.17
The gathering fees are decided either by individual
households or by groups of households (when they use their
pastures together or prefer to have one policy to prevent
possible conflicts and competition in the future). The fee
depends on a locality and the quality of its yartsa and on
the current price of the fungus. So, the fluctuations in the
yartsa market prices between 2007 and 2010 were reflected
in the ups and downs of fee levels. For example, in Wirkung,
known for its rich resources (in 2010 the most successful
17. It would mean that during the gathering season the number of
migrants outnumbers the locals by five to one. If an average family leases the
land out to twenty diggers, their number would reach almost 8,000 persons.
To this number has to be added “thieves”, as the locals say, who sneak into
Domkhok without paying fees. Yet another group consists of herders or
“helping hands” hired to help with household tasks. It is common that they
are paid in yartsa: they can go gathering yartsa together with all household
members.

digger claimed having found 300 pieces in one day18), the
fees were:
However high the fees might seem, when the current
market price for fungus is good, there is never a lack of persons
2007

2008

2009

2010

Gathering fee per
15,000
5,000
7,000
10,0002
person (in yuan)
Table 2: Ophiocordyceps gathering fees 2007-2010, Wirkung valley,
Domkhok Township, Machen County, Golok TAP.
2. This is not the highest gathering fee of Domkhok 2010: in Tanchen the
fees reached 15,000 yuan, and in Gangri Township they were even higher.

willing to dig. In fact, at the end of one gathering season
all the best digging localities are contracted for the coming
year. Some degree of flexibility in arranging the payment is
possible (the diggers can sometimes pay after the season), but
many pastoralists state their unwillingness to compromise: “If
they can’t pay, they can’t dig. If they have no cash, there is
no way.” This is accompanied by other statements on how
much sought after the digging “positions” are and how many
people “queue” to pay for what other candidates cannot
afford. Similar statements show who in this situation is (or
at least feels to be) the side dictating the conditions of the
cooperation.
The size of this enormous seasonal flow of people can be
seen in the example of Wirkung, whose inhabitants decided
not to let in more than eighty gatherers per season. In this
case, the quality of the land justifies the high fee and allows
the land “owners” to earn enough (80 diggers times 10,000
earns 800,000 yuan to share between four households)
without risking their own security or too obvious land
degradation.19 In other places, where the residents do not
have a common policy, and the grassland is of lower quality,
the number of diggers is higher: to Mechen (dMe chen)
valley up to three hundred diggers come every year (but the
fee in 2010 was only 5,000 to 6,000 yuan). Probably the
most extreme case comes from Gangri Township, where the
gathering fees reach an astronomic 20,000 yuan per person.
In a widely commented on incident from 2008, a family from
Gangri leased their pastureland to 360 diggers at one time.
This case became public when the prefecture and county
officials became alarmed by information they received from a
“secret” source and took action to check the actual situation.
The consequences of this extravagant contract were sad: the
pastureland was confiscated, and two years later the family
was still appealing to various institutions trying to get the
land back.
18. Such good “harvests” are not common (this number is from the
beginning of the gathering season) but suggests what mass of yartsa the
valley produces.
19. Eighty persons might seem enough to create trouble for a small
pastureland and the non-Tibetan diggers are often accused by the pastoralists
of not “handling” the digging properly (it is said that they do not close the
holes in the ground created by the removing of the fungus). However, as my
informants from the county administration reported, eighty diggers is still a
number tolerated by the authorities.

LIVESTOCK ECONOMY IN DOMKHOK
Before the Ophiocordyceps gathering boom started,
Domkhok pastoralists depended on their “traditional” yak and
sheep breeding economy. In 2008 (sources quoted in Table 1)
the total livestock population was reported to be 41,003 head
(9,462 yaks and 31,032 sheep). More recent numbers (given
in a document circulated among the township cadres, and
read to me by my informant in 2010) were: 7,742 yaks and
28,351 sheep.20 The township officials themselves estimate
the average livestock ownership in 2010 as follows:
Households

Yaks

Sheep

Horses

Middle-affluent

50

50-100

2

% in the township
50%

Poor

10-20

0

1

20-25%

Rich

200-280

300

3-6

25-30%

Table 3: Estimated livestock ownership per household, Domkhok Township,
Machen County, Golok TAP, 2010.

Just as it was with sizes of the caterpillar fungus
“harvests”, numbers of livestock owned are sensitive topics
in public conversations. The environmental protection laws,
which insist on reducing the pressure from the herds on the
pastureland, cause the pastoralists to hide the real size of
their herds. The figures from the official sources are based on
numbers “allowed” or “acceptable” rather than representing
de facto ownership by the nomads. My survey showed that the
smallest single herd in Domkhok never went below fifty yaks,
the average ownership was between seventy and eighty yaks,
and families owning a hundred or more were not infrequent.
SHEEP OWNERSHIP
There is a saying, “There are three kinds of lies: lies,
damned lies and statistics,” which Mark Twain made popular.
The sheep records from Domkhok should be approached
with reservation, which the saying calls for. Both the officially
published data and officials’ “private” estimations do not
adequately enumerate the sheep population and its current
decline. If we round up the number of Domkhok households
to 400 and take the sheep head numbers from Table 3 as
factual, we would have to agree that over 50,000 sheep (plus
about 40,000 yaks) graze on the township’s pasturelands. This
number not only exceeds the official data to an improbable
degree, but cannot be accepted for another reason: even a
casual visit to Domkhok reveals that something is missing
from the grassland. The sheep are missing.
The decline of the sheep population was observed not
only in Domkhok but also in the rest of Golok and other
parts of Qinghai inhabited by Tibetan pastoralists (Ptackova:
20. These and the following figures come from a series of interviews
with the township officials. Each of them was asked to estimate the values
(Table 3) of average livestock ownership for middle-affluent, poor and rich
households. “Rich” or “poor” indicate “poverty” or “affluence” as measured
by livestock ownership. In present-day Golok, rural households’ economic
standing does not directly depend on the numbers of livestock owned.
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2010). In Domkhok the decline in sheep numbers is variously
estimated, depending on the source. An official, who has
served on high positions in the township administration
structures for thirteen years, estimated that within this period
the sheep population dropped 40 percent.21 Another official
estimated a 60 percent decrease. Furthermore, the township
administrators noted that some 30 percent of families do not
own any sheep in Domkhok today, while in the late 1990s it
was only five percent. In reality, sheep numbers are smaller
than the above estimates suggest. The survey I conducted
showed that sheep owning families were in a striking minority,
and rarely more than two out of ten households could pride
themselves on continuing to practice this branch of their
economy.
There is one explanation that clarifies the gap between
official data and observations from this study. Sheep breeding
for sale and household consumption and sheep “keeping” are
two separate things. Certainly a large number of households
keep some sheep, for which tsethar (tse thar) or the ritual of
liberating animals from the prospect of being slaughtered was
performed.22 In Domkhok the majority of tsethar animals is
female. Although, in Tibetan Buddhist theory, performing
tsethar ritual for male animals makes more sense, since the
males are more prone to end their life under the knife of a
Muslim butcher, the pastoralists in Domkhok make their own
choices.23 Families that sold their “productive” sheep off can
still keep the “unslaughterable” animals. These sheep do not
contribute to the household budget, unless they are still of
reproductive age (if freed ewes happen to have lambs, these do

Figure 1: Sheep ownership (excluding tsethar animals), Dmokhok Township Machen County, Golok TAP, 2009
21. This and following information from the conversations with the
township administration employees of various levels were collected in June
2010. Names of the informants and their positions are not given for generally
accepted reasons.
22. Tsethar is a Buddhist practice common throughout Tibet. A herd
owner can select some of his animals and “grant” them life till natural death.
The animal cannot be slaughtered and given/sold to anybody if there is a risk
that it will be slaughtered. For more about tsethar cf. Holler 2000.
23. The Golok preference for female tsethar animals contrasts with the
observations from Tibet Autonomous Region gathered in Holler 2000. In my
area “theoretical” descriptions given by religious specialists on how the ritual
should be performed diverged from the herders’ practice, who were blamed
by some monk informants for ignorance about how a “proper” tsethar should
be made.
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not inherit the mother’s status, and are edible). State statistics
record total numbers, without differentiating between the
status of two sheep. In my survey, however, the focus was on
the animals as production means. Hence, from the following
diagram, tsethar sheep are excluded:
Figure 1: Sheep ownership (excluding tsethar animals), Domkhok Township,
Machen County, Golok TAP, 2009.

The above figure shows the proportion of the number of
families still owning sheep and those who do not have any
“productive” sheep anymore. 83 percent of today’s no-sheep
households consist of two sub-groups: those who sold their
herds off and those who never had any sheep. The latter
group comprises of young households established within the
last decade. The decline in the importance of sheep can be
seen also in the fact that parents or in-laws who still keep
their own sheep do not give them to the younger generation,
as if sheep breeding was not a profession for the future.
The reasons for sheep sell off by the pastoralists in
Domkhok are various. The households that decided to sell all
their animals in the last decade indicated several difficulties
in sheep raising, which contributed to their decision. These
include reasons of environmental and demographic character,
namely: (1) lack of labor for sheep herding, (2) insufficient
land, (3) declining quality of grass, which, in spite of the
family’s theoretically sufficient pastureland, cannot feed yaks
and sheep at the same time and, finally, (4) a harsh climate
in Golok, making it difficult for the lambs to survive. These
four (arranged according to the frequency of answers given)
are added to by (5) lack of guns to protect the herds against
wolves. These reasons have cumulative effect (they strengthen
each other). A forty year old herder, owning 130 yaks (he sold
his 220 sheep in 2002) cited winter colds and high altitude
(which affect sheep more than yaks), the effort owners must
make to herd sheep, and their vulnerability to predation by
wolves as reasons which pushed him to quit sheep breeding.
As in Huntington’s explanation for waves of
democratization (1993: 50), the reasons for the decline in
the sheep population should be bi-modal. To explain why
this decline has happened, one needs to look into both: why
the sheep are sold off, but also why they are not. It is thus
worth investigating the opinion of those who, in spite of the
declared obstacles, make the seemingly economically unviable
decision of retaining their flocks. Against explanations citing
the quality or quantity of grassland or the lack of human
resources, arguments of emotional or “cultural” character
were put forward. Herders declared their fondness for sheep
or their attachment to tradition. They described those who
sold off the sheep as “lazy,” saying that this and not anything
else explained why people sell their animals off. It is important
that the economic standing of the ex-sheep owners is not
substantially different to those who continue to raise sheep.
If the households that sold their sheep are of similar size and
are as able to mobilize labor, and have land of similar extent
and sometimes better quality, the motives for sheep selling
can be sought outside of the five reasons listed above. These

owned by those nomadic pastoralists who are
not covered by the resettlement program, and
keeping them in constant check.
Domkhok has not been covered by the
resettlement program. For the local population
the main contact with the environmentalist
policies are the meetings organized in the
township, where the pastoralists are lectured
on the need to protect the environment.
Although township leaders deny the
existence of limits on livestock ownership, the
pastoralists admit that they are not supposed
to keep herds exceeding numbers calculated
according to the scheme: one sheep per four
mu of land, one yak equaling four sheep or
sixteen mu of land. Since the tax abolition
no control of the herd sizes was reported
by people interviewed. And, since the fiscal
duties to the state have been cancelled, none
of them knew what consequences would
occur should the township administration
bring a case against persons caught stocking
their grazing grounds above the limit: “We
are told we must not keep more yaks than we
can, but I’ve not heard of any fine for that.”
In none of the dozens of interviews with
the Domkhok pastoralists was environmental
protection mentioned in the context of sheep
selling, and nobody signaled that he or she
was told or forced to sell his or her sheep or
that the policy influenced this decision in any
significant way. When asked whether it is the
Figure 2: Approximate sheep sales in the area studied 2000-2010, Domkhok Township,
state planners’ wish that Tibetan pastoralists
Machen County, Golok TAP.
sell their sheep off, the informants strongly
asserted their autonomy in their decision making process. It
five certainly contribute to the decision making process, but a
can, of course, be argued that the lectures and discourse on
stronger stimulus must come from somewhere else.
environmental protection penetrate local society and create
an atmosphere favoring sheep selling over sheep keeping. Yet
DESTOCKING AND CHINA’S NEW ECOLOGY
it seems improbable that the Domkhok pastoralists’ massive
The state policy of Turning Pastureland into Grassland
sheep selling was or is a direct result of steps taken by the
(Chin. Tuimu huancao) announced in 2003, stipulates that
local authorities.
to restore the balance on the grasslands of large parts of West
China, restrictions should be put on the scale of use of the
pasturelands. In practical terms it means delineating zones
temporarily closed to grazing, and others where grazing is
banned on a permanent basis. It implies removing herds and
people from their previous settlements and moving them to
new urban or semi-urban ones. The resettlement policy has
been implemented in twenty six of forty five townships in
Golok TAP and official sources declare that 2,702 households
have been moved to new settlements, and nearly 20,920 km²
of grassland have been closed to grazing (GTH 2010). Apart
from the resettlement, which is a widely commented upon
facet of the new policy (Yeh 2005, Zukosky 2007, Foggin
2008, Du 2009, Xun and Bao 2010), this new environmentalist
turn in state thinking postulates limiting the sizes of herds

DO SHEEP EARN MONEY?
A chronology of economy-related events in Golok helps
to clarify the background of the studied phenomenon. The
first noted cases of clearing the grasslands of whole flocks of
sheep in Domkhok dates from the year 2000. This timing was
mentioned by local leaders and environmental activists. It
is possible that some families reduced their sheep numbers
in other Tibetan areas earlier, but only after 2000 did sheep
selling in Domkhok become common. Figure 2 shows how
the number of households which sold their flocks of sheep
grew between 2000 and 2010 in the area studied. The data
gathered come from altogether fifty households.
Figure 2 shows change in proportions between households
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which sold off their sheep and those which resisted this
trend. It leaves out those families which never owned any
sheep. The exponential curve of increase in the number
of households which decided to quit sheep rearing shows
a spectacular “jump” after 2004. Two dates can be helpful
to contextualize this rapid change. In 2002, as the nomads
recollect, the first caterpillar fungus gatherers arrived in
Domkhok and paid the gathering fees directly to the nomads
on whose land they wanted to stay. In 2004, the agricultural
tax reform reached Domkhok. These two points, the reform
in the yartsa gathering regulations and tax abolition, as the
pastoralists say, have changed their fortunes. Domkhok’s
economy is reported to have been steadily improving since
the late 1980s, but in the 2000s the nomads’ income rose
to heights unknown before, and yartsa gathering and fees
became the central pillar of the households’ material wellbeing.
Seen in the context of this improvement in the pastoralist
economy the growth in the sheep selling-off trend is not
surprising. It is partly confirmed by the records of the
largest slaughter house in Xining. Its manager confirmed
that the absolute peak in the numbers of sheep they bought
from all over Qinghai was in 2006 when, according to his
estimations, over three million sheep were sold for meat. Two
Tibetan prefectures, Golok and Yushu, were their important
suppliers. The same informant said that after 2006 the
numbers of sheep sold went down and the market stabilized.
My survey gives a similar impression: within the group of
households studied none declared having sold off their sheep
after 2007.
Two questions from my survey are critical for
understanding the fate of sheep in Domkhok: (1) “Would you
ever sell your sheep if you didn’t have income from yartsa
gunbu?” and (2) “Did you see any change in enthusiasm for
the livestock breeding after the yartsa gunbu trade started?”
Almost all persons answered “No” to the first, and “Yes” to the
second question. While the answer given to the first one was
usually followed with the herder’s rhetorical question, “What
would I live from?”, the answers to the second one were more
descriptive:
People have now good income such as they
would never get from keeping animals.
And prices for animal products are very
low, which doesn’t help to increase people’s
interest in keeping animals properly. Wool
or sheep skins, or yak cashmere and hides,
and even milk and meat can’t make you
good money.
What then are the prices of sheep products at the market
in Golok? In 2010, sheep wool earned around seven yuan
per kilogram. A household owning a flock of 200 sheep can
sell around 200 kg of wool in one year (an average Golok
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sheep gives one jin and several shang of wool24). Shearing that
number of sheep takes up to six hours of the collective work
of ten people. The mathematics is simple: a day of work for six
persons plus transporting the wool to town gives an income
(in 2010 prices) of only 1400 yuan.25 Sheep skins are a ready
by-product of sheep slaughter. The price is better: 20 to 60
yuan depending on the animal’s age and size (20 yuan for 2-3
year old, 30-50 yuan for adult females, and 60 yuan for the
biggest males). Finally, sheep are sold for meat: an average
animal weighing in at 15 kg fetched 350 yuan at the market.
Neither Golok nor Wranakh nomads milk ewes, so milk is
not a source of income To decide whether or not this price
is worth the effort of sheep breeding is up to an individual’s
assessment, but compared to the large sums paid for animal
products in the past—some of them episodic and lasting a
year or two, but well remembered by informants (such as 280
yuan for sheep skins in 1995-1996)—recent prices seem less
attractive and are often complained about.
Whether or not sheep production can substantially
contribute to the household budget is shown in the example
of two neighboring families: one holding on to their flock
of sheep and another who had sold their flock. The first,
Mr Dorji’s household (Table 4), had six members, owned
“around a hundred” yaks, 200 sheep and four horses (all this
information recorded in 2010). The second, Mr Tserdor’s
household (Table 5) had seven members and owned 90
yaks and six horses. Their sheep, totaling 170, were sold
in 2006 due to, as Tserdor declared, big losses to wolves
and a lack of people who had time to “look after them all
day long.” Both households applied different strategies to
generate income. Tserdor declared that his family did not
sell any yaks in 2009 but instead increased sales of cheese
and butter. Dorji’s household relied on a more diversified
array of income streams, leaving out only sales of the rough
outer yak hair rtsipa (rtsid pa) and the soft undercoat kulu
(khu lu): yak undercoat or yak cashmere price fell to 10 yuan
per kg, which, as the family judged, made its production
unprofitable (they recalled 24-26 yuan/kg paid in the late
1990s). Both households shared their summer pastures, and
their land produced similar amounts of Ophiocordyceps. Thus
differences in the yartsa income, in the land quality or its size
as a factor differentiating the families could be passed over.
What makes it all the more like a “controlled comparison”
is that both households had a similar structure and none of
them could claim having more human resources than the
other.
24. Shang (srang) is a Tibetan weight unit equaling Chinese liao or
around 37.5 g.
25. Wool from Golok is of lower quality than that from Qilian mountains
and other pastoral regions specializing in sheep production. Although a high
employee of Qinghai Plateau Tibetan Sheep Carpet Co. Ltd assured me that
their carpets are woven of Tibetan wool, local wool is pushed out of the
market by imports from Australia and New Zealand. It is also not a secret
that mutton served in Tibet is often imported from oversees, and finding a
local sheep skin sufficient for a gonkha (gong kha) collar in a robe is next to
impossible.

Estimated
quantity sold
in one year
(2009)3

Value per
piece/kg

Total
contribution
to the yearly
budget

Yaks

10

2,000 yuan/yak

20,000

Yak hides

4

100 yuan/hide

400

Yak hair
and cashmere

-

-

-

Butter

50 kg

40 yuan/kg

2,000

Cheese

50 kg

26 yuan/kg

1,300

Sheep

50

350/sheep

17,500

Sheep skins

10

30 yuan/skins

300

Wool

200 kg

7 yuan/kg

1,400

Yartsa gathering

1,000 pieces

-

Not sold yet

Yartsa gathering
fees

20 diggers, 10,000 yuan each

Total

200,000
242,900

Table 4: Estimated income in Dorji’s household (owning sheep), Domkhok
Township, Machen County, Golok TAP, 2010.
3. The following numbers come from the pastoralists’ own estimations. The
focus is on stable points in the budget, and all “occasional” earnings from
selling a car, motorbike etc. are excluded from the tables.

Estimated
quantity sold
in one year
(2009)

Value per
piece/kg

Total
contribution
to the yearly
budget

Yaks

-

-

-

Yak hides

4

90 yuan/hide

360

Yak hair
and cashmere

35 kg

10 yuan/kg

350

Butter

100 kg

40 yuan/kg

4,000

Cheese

100 kg

26 yuan/kg

2,600

Sheep

-

-

-

Sheep skins

-

-

-

Wool

-

-

-

Yartsa gathering

1.30 kg

54,000 yuan/
kg

70,200

20 diggers, 10,000 yuan each

200,000

Yartsa gathering
fees
Total

277,510

Table 5: Estimated income in Tserdor’s household (owning no sheep),
Domkhok Township, Machen County Golok TAP, 2010.

Sheep breeding is perceived as inconvenient by many for
the same reason it is burdensome to Dorji’s household. The
family’s senior members, over seventy years old, have retired
to the village, where the family bought a house in 2002. Their
teenage son lives with his grandparents in the village, and
studies in a township school, while the elder daughter attends
a boarding school in Tawu. Thus, out of six persons only two
live permanently in the mountains. This results in a shortage
of labor, which the family solved by employing a year-round
resident shepherd from Huzhu (paid 10,000 yuan a year plus
food and clothing). Furthermore, the 2,070 mu of land the
family can use do not suffice, as they say, for the herds they
own. This problem they solved by leasing a plot of land for
winter grazing (5,000 yuan a year).
Dorji’s household is thus in a situation not so dissimilar
from other Domkhok families, which echoed the sentiments
of the informants from the Churu valley:
We sold our [280] sheep last year [2009].
Our four grandchildren are at school, we
[the interviewee and his wife] live in town.
My son-in-law looks after the yaks, and
there is nobody who could do the same for
the sheep. It’s only two people there in the
mountains. For a small family like us it’s
not possible to keep sheep anymore.
However, in Churu more than half of the households hire
“helping hands” (usually from Tibetan farming communities
in Qinghai), who stay with them and take over the herding.
The quoted family is not an exception. Dorji could also agree
with some complaints expressed by yet another informant:
We don’t have enough land. There is less
and less grass every year, and so many abras
(a bra)!26 The sheep don’t have enough to
eat, so we sold them off. Anyway, almost
everybody did.
However, around 20 percent (as the township leader
estimated) of the Domkhok pastureland is leased between
the households. So if the family wanted to keep their sheep
they could probably manage to find a solution not only
for the lack of working hands, but also for the shortage of
grassland. In spite of observable problems and the need for
extra investment to solve them, Dorji’s family not only did
not sell the sheep, but, instead, enlarged their flocks. In 2009
they bought an additional forty sheep (800 yuan each), which
totals another 32,000 yuan of investment.
Can the power of sentiment balance the difficulties in
sheep breeding? With extra investment, probably yes. This
cannot, however, mask the relatively small contribution the
26. Abra or Plateau Pika (Lat. Ochotona curzoniae and other Ochotona)
is a small burrowing animal widespread in Golok. It is considered a pest and
targeted by poisoning and other actions aimed at reducing its population.
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sheep products make to the household’s finances. As shown
in Table 4 and 5, sheep production takes place somewhere
in the lower registers of profitability. While yartsa-related
income reaches 82 percent in the sheep owning household
(97 percent in the other one), sheep production contributes
slightly more than seven percent. The income from yartsa
wins in this competition also by how quickly one can earn it:
it is quick money, earned in two months. It also requires little
effort: its major part comes not from the fungus which the
family members gathered themselves, but from their actions
as managers of the gathering process, i.e. from contracting the
land to gatherers.
Availability of so much cash income is blamed in the local
discourse in Golok for changing pastoralists’ approach to other
jobs, where yields are not commensurate with effort. Here is
one of the fundaments of the critique of the social side effects
of the Ophiocordyceps business. One encounters this critique
when trying to theorize the meaning of yartsa gathering for
the life of pastoralists in Golok. Instead of praises complaints
are made, as this by a yoghurt factory owner:
Of course it doesn’t make any sense to
produce milk for us, of course. We pay
only 3.5 yuan per jin of milk and we expect
regular deliveries. Who would like to work
like that?
Indeed, a number of informants admitted that they throw
away sheep skins and even yak hides as not worth carrying
to market. Apart from such extremes, the availability of the
new income encourages pastoralists to reduce their reliance
on livestock production (a growing number of households
do not sell any butter and cheese or any yaks). Compared
with the ease of earning yartsa income, sheep breeding
becomes economically “irrational.” Costs include not only the
shepherd’s salary and land rent, but also labor in herding or
during the lambing period.
MARKETS
Domkhok lies a short drive from the town of Tawu. The
township’s simple roads connect the pastoralists’ winter
quarters with the town and the township seat “village”. There
is no public nor commercial transportation services available,
and only with their private vehicles can the pastoralists reach
Tawu. In 2007-2010 cars and motorcycles were in general
use. Increased contact with town whose meat stalls invite
buyers all day long can discourage the pastoralists from
breeding their own sheep.
Prior to 2000, according to informants’ recollections,
when they did not have their own transportation, they
rarely went shopping, and the amount of non-homemade
food products they consumed was lower than today. Home
ground tsampa (rtsam pa), meat from home-slaughter and
milk products were the basics the families relied upon. Today,
informants are reducing consumption of their own animals
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in favor of rice, vegetables, noodles and flour-made dishes.
They admit they slaughter half the number of yaks (for home
consumption) they did a decade ago. With cars or motorcycles
(every household in the survey owned at least a motorcycle),
the Domkhok pastoralists can go to town more easily, and
usually once a week they fetch a new supply of vegetables,
fruit and meat. In the most exceptional cases, informants
declared that they go to town every second or every day.
Markets with their butcher shops are thus now easier
to access. The pastoralists also have disposable cash from the
caterpillar fungus business enabling them to regularly shop
at the market. They can buy their beloved mutton instead of
breeding and slaughtering their own sheep. The two trends
(buying mutton and selling off sheep) strengthen each other:
the fewer sheep people own, the more mutton they need to
purchase from the market, and the more people buy the less
sense they see in keeping their own sheep. With the widely
available market supplies of mutton, one more argument for
keeping sheep is countered.
YAKS
The declining sheep population should also be analyzed
in relation to numbers of yaks. Township officials ascertained
that not only the sheep but also the yak population is declining,
although at a lower rate. However, my survey did not confirm
this claim. Its results show that Domkhok pastoralists keep
more yaks than the official sheep-to-grassland ratio allows. A
reliable local source said that as much as 40 percent of all yaks
in the township are those beyond the prescribed limit. This
could be checked, for example, with local veterinarians, who
dispense livestock vaccination shots: while “within-the-limit”
animals receive them at public cost, those for the shadowsphere-yaks must be paid by the herders.
A preference to have large herds of yaks has been
discussed by many authors. It was analyzed as a method of
keeping savings, an insurance against sudden livestock losses
or a compensation for the animals’ low productivity and late
reproductive maturity (Farooquee 1998, Levine 1999, Yan et
al. 2002). It has been argued that killing “too many” animals is
against the Tibetans’ respect for life, and hence something the
pastoralists try to avoid. On the other hand, a sea of ink has
been used to prove that herds that are too large are responsible
for grassland degradation. A large part of the official discourse
about desertification and resettlement is based on asserting
that overgrazing made areas like Martod (rMa stod) County
in Golok a bleak and devastated land although as recently
as the 1980s it was still said to be a lush paradise for both
pastoralists and their yaks.
The state-launched environmental protection programs
call for destocking the grassland. Yaks however do not seem
to be their victims. Pastoralists interviewed explained that,
practically speaking, yaks are easier to hide if government
officials come to the highlands to count the animals. The
statistics show that yak herds are shrinking, but a contradictory
signal comes from the market. Both the observation of the

market and the survey show that the herders
sell fewer animals and many of them do not
sell any. Since yak selling patterns require long
term research no conclusive statements can be
issued here. It is certain though that within the
years covered by my study it became popular
in Domkhok to sell few or no yaks at all.27
The avoidance of selling livestock and
increased reliance on other sources of income
has been also noted from Golok by Costello
(2008: 74), and from Yushu TAP by Gruschke
(2008: 18). It is also reported from Bhutan
where people in areas drawing their income
from fungus gathering stop selling their
yaks.28 Some scholars see this decrease in
livestock sales as a sign of the ability to adapt
one’s livelihood strategies to changes in the
market (Fischer 2008: 36). However, this is
problematic for officials I interviewed, as it
contradicts the official data. Asked directly how
yak numbers can drop when the herders sell
The end of the journey: slaughterhouse in Xining. Photo: Emilia Sułek
less, they claimed that the animals’ mortality
sell sheep but not yaks. This difference in the fate of these two
and people’s consumption still keep the herds in check. But
animal species touches upon a bigger issue of different ethos
the Domkhok pastoralists, as I have noted, eat fewer animals
or values connected to these two (yak and sheep) branches of
from their own herds and instead choose to rely more on
the pastoral economy and different functions these two have
purchases from the butcher.29
(or used to have).
An explanation of why people sell their sheep should
Is it that by selling sheep the pastoralists can “win”
also examine why they are so reluctant to sell yaks. The
something in debates about yak numbers? This correlation
reasons given by informants range from prices that are
between lower sheep and growing yak numbers needs further
too low to Buddhist precepts that invoke compassion and
investigation, but it can be posited that the yak population
suggest refraining from selling yaks for slaughter. Among the
grows at the expense of sheep. In case of stronger pressure
pastoralists interviewed the Buddhist explanation was more
from environmental policies, the pastoralists can argue that
common. One could ask why the sheep do not receive the
by selling off their sheep they have contributed to pastureland
same compassion.
conservation. An official from Domkhok admitted that in a
The preference for large herds of yaks needs reinvestigation
situation of choice the pastoralists would sacrifice their sheep
in places like Domkhok, which no longer belong to the
first. In this context, the decision to sell off sheep can have a
sphere of the subsistence economy. Large herds of yaks are
strategic value: of safeguarding the right to keep yaks.
not as crucial for the pastoralists’ survival as they used to be.
Yaks are not necessary to moving camps, since pastoralists
DISAPPEARED SHEEP: CONSEQUENCES AND
now have cars. And who spins yak hair into tent cloth when
COMMENTS
black tents are now a rarity? Theoretically speaking, sheep, in
the herders’ own words, have some advantages which yaks
In their 1986 book Poverty of Plenty Bai and Wang tried
lack. They grow faster and are more easily converted into
to explain the striking differences between the economically
cash. But now cash comes mainly from caterpillar fungus.
advanced Eastern parts of China and her rural, Western regions.
Yet, it is not only economic reasoning which can make one
Over two decades have passed since the book appeared,
and the authors might wish to adjust their opinions today.
27. I asked informants who had not sold their yaks whether or not
Certainly they are not the only ones to think that in pastoral
they worried about the future condition of their pasturelands. The answers
regions of Tibet there are some intrinsic determinants of
suggested what was already described by Breivik (2007: 59ff): that the
pastoralists connect the lower productivity of the land to the plague of insects
economic underdevelopment which do not let their residents
and rodents, human interference in the landscape (mining), and fencing the
move up the ladder of progress. The authors’ diagnosis,
land rather than to the stocking numbers.
unfavorable to the pastoralists, reads: “In comparison with
28. Dorji Dhradhul, pers. comm., Xining, June 6, 2010, Tshitila, pers.
developed regions the rural inhabitants of backward regions
comm., December 12, 2010.
29. Also in Yushu pastoralists slaughter fewer of their own animals, but
are clearly characterized by a general lack of entrepreneurial
buy them from others and have them slaughtered (Andreas Gruschke, pers.
spirit and an excessive adherence to old ways”. Furthermore,
comm., February 7, 2011).
their “interpersonal relations (…) are clearly characterized by
a weak commodity sense in economic relations and a strong
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traditionalism in social relations.” All this, the authors argued,
is reinforced by low educational standards, low exposure
to mass media and weak information flow, lack of proper
transport and scarcity of market towns which do not help
the pastoralists develop “more rationality” in their economic
thinking (1991: 38, 48, 55ff). If this rationality depended on
exposure to television (TV sets have successfully made their
way into the pastoralists’ houses) and was a function of better
connection to markets, the Domkhok pastoralists must have
by now gained, in Bai and Wang’s theory, the ability to “think
economically.”
None of the individuals quoted in this paper, neither those
who sold their sheep off nor those who say they are determined
to keep them, openly referred to economic arguments. This
ostensible lack of economic arguments could be misleading,
when the decision itself appears to be of an economic nature.
Some could argue that it is the snowball effect which drives
dozens of households to sell their sheep after the “first one”
did so several years ago. Others propose that it is a forced
move and that the pastoralists are involuntarily following
the dictates of the state’s new policy. But is there indeed no
“economy” in the herders’ reasoning?
There are numerous arguments against sheep, but
not many in favor of continuing sheep breeding. In the
pastoralists’ own words, decreased labor availability and
insufficient grassland resources are the main reasons for their
abandoning sheep production. Production for the market
appears senseless due to low returns (in comparison with
other alternatives) and high opportunity costs. Keeping their
flocks for subsistence production is not a necessity anymore.
Better access to town and the pastoralists’ closer integration
with the commodity market make mutton purchases
possible at almost any time when meat is needed. Not by
coincidence did the sheep business lose its attractiveness
during the increase of profits generated from the caterpillar
fungus economy, which injected large amounts of cash into
the pastoralists’ budgets. The emergence of this new source
of income has strongly affected rural livelihoods and tipped
the scales in favor of the cash economy at the expense of the
traditional, essentially subsistence-oriented economy. The
sheep had to pay the price.
The phenomenon of “disappearing sheep” is reported
from Golok and other Tibetan pastoral areas of China—those
where caterpillar fungus trade is an important part of the local
economy.30 It varies in dynamics and scale, and also in the
set of reasons precipitating the herders’ decisions. They result
from the interplay of a range of factors, whose significance
30. Decline in sheep numbers has been observed throughout the Three
River Source National Nature Reserve (Ptackova: 2010). This could suggest
that it is the ecology-oriented state policies which stand behind the sheep
“disappearance.” Yet, sheep breeding has also declined in Bhutan, wherever
caterpillar fungus contributes to the local economy (Tshitila, pers. comm.,
December 12, 2010). But no decline in sheep numbers has been observed in
Western Tibet (in TAR) where pastoralists do not depend on the caterpillar
fungus trade for their income (Melvyn Goldstein, pers. comm., November
17, 2010).
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depends on a specific local situation. Thus it is important to
be cautious in extrapolating findings from one area to others.
For example, the new environmental policies create frames
within which selling off the sheep may appear to be the right
move, but the degree to which they impact the pastoralists’
decision making process can vary. In Domkhok Township,
which enjoys a rather positive environmental situation, the
environmental policies can support the pastoralists in their
choices, but do not determine what they finally do. At the
same time, in areas which are affected by land degradation
and ecological resettlement, the situation can be different, and
pressure for environmental protection is more strongly felt in
decision making.31
None of the reasons discussed in this article is sufficient
and none of them necessary for the trend to sell off the sheep.
None but one: without the emergence of the lucrative income
from the caterpillar fungus, the sheep selling trend, with
its scale as noted from the area studied, would be difficult
to imagine. The impact of the caterpillar fungus boom is
important also because many other phenomena in the local
society are closely connected to it—the pastoralists’ increased
integration with and dependence on the town markets is a
consequence of improved transportation and availability of
cash income, and this again relates to Ophiocordyceps. The
availability of the yartsa income is the only factor, among
those discussed, which suffices to cause a response like this
(in this situation, other things being equal). It could suffice
hypothetically, because neither the decline in sheep numbers
nor the caterpillar fungus gathering business can be analyzed
separately from the bigger picture of the realities of social life
and economy in Domkhok. Complementary reasons, like
changes in the family size and grassland productivity, are also
important.
The case of Domkhok demonstrates something else as
well. A small number of families that did not follow the sellthe-sheep-off trend and continue to maintain their animals,
would be labeled in the terminology of social science as
“deviant cases” (Kendall & Wolf 1955). They show how and at
what cost the sheep economy can be maintained. Interestingly,
these families explained their faith in sheep breeding in terms
of their emotional attachment or its cultural importance for
Golok society. With some effort, some Domkhok families
are able to keep their sheep—but only if they are willing to
organize an additional workforce and invest their savings in
it. In other words, they are willing to subsidize an economy
which is not extremely profitable, but perceived as having
a value beyond its immediate material aspect. Thus if the
emergence of the caterpillar fungus cash economy gave the
pastoralists the power to make choices and give up what they
31. What is so far reported is that the pastoralists sell their sheep off
expecting some move from the local authorities but not as a reaction to it.
Knowing of the plans to enforce new stocking quotas, some nomads started
selling off their livestock early, before prices declined when everybody would
have to sell (observation from Tanlag, 2009, Jarmila Ptackova, pers. comm.,
November 20, 2010).

saw as, for example, overly hard work, it also gave them a
chance to continue it by providing the capital necessary to
overcome the difficulties in sheep breeding which today’s
pastoralists face.
Sheep do not prove to be a powerful cultural constraint
in Golok, and since Golok and Wranakh nomads are yak
rather than sheep herders, losing sheep from their cultural
landscape does not have to cause much harm to the
pastoralists’ identity: yaks are more makers of the status quo.
With the grassland itself the story may unfold differently.
Cutting the number of sheep makes the pastureland look less
crowded—this is what the policy planners desire. Yet, it is
debatable if removing the sheep from the grasslands really
could bring about the improved health of the environment.
Indigenous environmental organizations in Golok stress that
only sheep and yaks together guarantee the optimal use of
the grassland and are alarmed that taking the sheep out of
the yak-sheep-horse trinity, which has been the essence of
past grazing regimes in the highlands, can cause more serious
trouble under the flag of saving the environment than the
sheep would really do.

M.A. thesis in Development Studies, Norwegian University of Life
Sciences, Aas.
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